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Children’s Inductive Reasoning: 
Developmental and Educational 
Perspectives
Patrick Perret
Aix Marseille Université, Aix en Provence, France
Omnipresent in human thought, inductive reasoning consists in (a) detecting regu-
larities, (b) abstracting relations, and (c) deriving general rules. In the first part of this 
article, I attempt to identify the basic mechanisms underpinning inductive reason-
ing and the reasons why it is so central to the workings of intelligence. I then go on 
to describe several factors that researchers in developmental psychology believe may 
contribute to the development of inductive reasoning. Each factor’s influence is illus-
trated by its potential contribution to the resolution of Raven’s Progressives Matrices. 
In the third and final part, I examine the issue from an educational perspective, 
showing how developmental hypotheses can inform different types of interventions 
designed to foster inductive reasoning in children.
Keywords: reasoning; induction; cognitive development; cognitive education; Raven’s 
Progressive Matrices
Inductive reasoning is central to the functioning of children’s intelligence and consti-tutes a driving force of cognitive development. It is one of the main levers by which children understand how the world around them works through the abstraction of its 
underlying rules. Theories of induction integrate arguments from various approaches and 
disciplines such as philosophy, history of sciences, mathematical modeling, artificial intel-
ligence, and psychology (Feeney & Heit, 2007). The aim of the present review is to identify 
the mechanisms that may govern the development of inductive reasoning in children. It is 
also to show that a finer grained knowledge of these developmental factors can illuminate our 
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interpretation of children’s difficulties on inductive reasoning tasks and guide educational 
strategies to support the growth of inductive skills.
WHAT IS INDUCTIVE REASONING?
“Reasoning is, in part, effortful perception” (Sternberg, 1986, p. 287).
The concept of inductive reasoning (IR) refers to the cognitive activity of generating 
inferences that classically meet two criteria: (a) direction (IR moves from the observation 
of particular cases to the formulation of more general rules) and (b) level of confidence 
(IR is a form of reasoning under uncertainty because it involves forming hypotheses about 
rules). As such, it is frequently defined in opposition to deductive reasoning: Deductive 
inferences move from the general to the particular and are logical necessities. In deduc-
tive arguments, the premises provide absolute grounds for accepting the conclusion. Bor-
rowed from Galotti, Komatsu, and Voelz (1997), the syllogisms provided in Figure 1 neatly 
illustrate this double contrast.
The deductive or inductive nature of a problem can therefore be broadly identified based 
on these two criteria (but see Heit, 2007, for extensive discussion of potential pitfalls in the 
delimitation of problems’ status). From a psychological point of view, several areas of research 
converge toward the assumption that distinct cognitive processes underpin the production of 
these two kinds of inferences.
The psychometric approach draws on individual differences of performance on batteries 
of tests to identify latent sources of variance reflecting separate (although interconnected) 
aptitudes. This line of research has consistently shown that inductive and deductive reason-
ing tests fell into distinct registers: To properly fit the data from individual differences, theo-
retical models of cognitive abilities have to incorporate this distinction (Carroll, 1993). On the 
experimental front, Heit and Rotello (2010) have found that inductive and deductive infer-
ences are differentially affected by experimental manipulations such as varying the similarity 
between categories used in the premise and the conclusion. With reference to the two-process 
accounts of reasoning (Evans, 2008), the authors suggested that inductive and deductive judg-
ments both recruit heuristic and analytic processes but in different proportions (deduction re-
lying more heavily on slower analytic processes). Finally, neuropsychological data also argue 
in favor of a dissociative view. Goel and Dolan (2004) studied the respective neuroanatomy 
of inductive versus deductive reasoning. Both were found to involve left prefrontal cortex, 
but deduction was associated with an increased activation of Broca’s area, whereas induction 
mainly recruited left dorsolateral prefrontal cortex.
FIGURE 1. Examples of deductive and inductive inferences.
Deduction
All poggops wear blue boots.
Tombor is a poggop.
→ Tombor wears blue boots.
Induction
Tombor is a poggop.
Tombor wears blue boots.
→ All poggops wear blue boots.
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Inductive inferences play a part in a wide range of daily cognitive activities. They include 
the following:
•	 	Feature	attribution	based	on	categorical	generalization:	when	we	hypothesize	that	all	
the members of a given category share a property after observing that one or several of 
them do
•	 	Analogical	 reasoning:	 when	 we	 hypothesize	 that	 a	 known	 relation	 between	 two	
concepts can tell us about the relation linking two other concepts
•	 	Causal	reasoning:	when	we	hypothesize	that	two	events	are	linked	by	a	causal	relation-
ship based on the observation of their conditional occurrence
•	 	Probabilistic	judgment:	when	we	modulate	our	predictions	about	future	events	after	
taking a sample of similar events into account
The sheer diversity of cognitive contexts involving the generation of inductive inferences 
suggests that they represent one of the commonest forms of human thought. Moshman 
(1995, 2004), however, stresses that a distinction should be made between the mere produc-
tion of inferences—often an implicit and largely unconscious activity—and actual reasoning, 
when we subject our inferences to a test of their validity: “Reasoning is epistemically self-
constrained thinking” (Moshman, 2004, p. 223). Therefore, reasoning is conceived of not as 
an automatic process but as an activity that is costly in attentional resources and where intel-
lectual effort is required to justify inferences. Kuhn (2013) goes one step further, asserting 
that it is not only a conscious activity but one that is explicitly goal oriented, whether this goal 
is simply understanding a situation or taking a decision that implies action.
INDUCTIVE REASONING AND THE DEVELOPMENT OF 
INTELLIGENCE
“Inductive reasoning enables one to detect regularities, rules, or generalizations and, con-
versely, to detect irregularities. This is one way in which we structure our world” (Klauer, 
Willmes, & Phye, 2002, p. 1).
The development of both fluid intelligence (the ability to resolve novel problems in work-
ing memory [WM]) and crystallized intelligence (the ability to elaborate and mobilize knowl-
edge in long-term memory) depends on IR. A long tradition of psychometric research has 
shown that of all the dimensions of intellectual functioning, fluid intelligence is the one with 
the highest general factor loading. IR is, in turn, the factor with the highest fluid intelligence 
loading (Carroll, 1993). This means that a considerable proportion of individual variation in 
intellectual efficiency is linked to variability in IR ability, which explains the enduring popu-
larity of Raven’s Progressive Matrices (RPM) as a tool for assessing intellectual functioning 
(Oakland & Hu, 1992). Raven based his reasoning test on Spearman’s (1927) conception that 
the eduction of relations (i.e., the ability to discern a relationship between two stimuli) con-
stitutes the core dimension of the general intelligence factor and determines the ability to 
make meaning out of confusion. IR is therefore classically assessed using tests that require 
relations to be abstracted. In both matrix tests and series completion tests (e.g., logical series), 
children have to figure out the laws governing the ordering of a set of items. The componen-
tial theory of inductive reasoning, proposed by Sternberg and Gardner (1983), articulates the 
psychometric and information-processing research traditions. Within this framework, latent 
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variables are thought to emerge from factor analyses because of commonalities in informa-
tion processing requirements of tasks usually used to assess inductive competence. The anal-
yses, conducted with analogy completion tasks, classification tasks, and series completion 
tasks, have led the authors to propose a model of IR based on five underlying processes: en-
coding (of the attributes characterizing elements), inference (of relations between elements), 
mapping of relations (seeking out a higher order general rule), application (of this rule from 
a new element to an hypothetical ideal completion), and response comparison (of this hypo-
thetical completion with response options). Research conducted by Mareschal and colleagues 
(Leech, Mareschal, & Cooper, 2007; Thomas & Mareschal, 2001) further suggested that rela-
tions are conceived of in the mind as transformations between states of the world: Because a 
relation is not a perceptual datum, it has to be mentally represented as the transformation of 
one entity into another.
IR lies at the heart of fluid intelligence because we can only resolve a problem once we 
have understood the relational system on which it is based. When solving complex and un-
familiar problems for which no specific content knowledge is applicable (i.e., the hallmark 
of fluid intelligence), inductive processes play a major role: It is by generating hypothetical 
rules, based on observations, that relational systems can be abstracted. Molnár, Greiff, and 
Csapó (2013) provided empirical support for this view: They studied developmental trends 
in problem-solving abilities and found that the correlations with IR efficiency were stable 
over time.
IR not only enables the online resolution of new problems but also the inducement of 
more general schemas promoting the transfer of resolution strategies between problems of 
the same class (Phye, 1990). As such, it also contributes to the development of crystallized in-
telligence. The seminal work of Holyoak on analogy as a powerful learning mechanism neatly 
illustrates this point (Gentner & Holyoak, 1997; Holyoak & Thagard, 1997): Detecting un-
derlying similarities between seemingly different situations favors the acquisition of higher 
order knowledge. For Holland, Holyoak, Nisbett, and Thagard (1986), the mental models 
that result from inductive processes are schematic representations of phenomena—be they 
physical, social, numerical, or logical—that the mind needs to understand to adapt to them. 
These cognitive representations may be only selective approximations but nonetheless allow 
the mind to engage in a form of adaptive anticipation: “The key feature of mental models 
is that they include structures and processes that can simulate the transitions that occur in 
phenomena being modeled” (p. 327).
In the light of this conception, the theories inductively developed by scientists to un-
derstand and represent the real world can be seen as an advanced form of mental model, 
with explicit and formalized construction mechanisms. However, scientists are not the only 
people to devise theories about the world around them. Gopnik and Wellman’s (1994) theory-
theory states that the knowledge elaborated by children resembles scientific theory in both 
its structure (e.g., its quest for an explanation, its requirement of coherence, its capacity for 
prediction and interpretation) and the inductive processes that lead to its elaboration, such 
as the analysis of covariation patterns between events or the effects of intervention (Cook, 
Goodman, & Schulz, 2011). In the course of development, these naive theories are fuelled not 
only by children’s autonomous IR but also by conceptual input from their cultural communi-
ties. Neo-Vygostkian approaches of theoretical learning in classrooms try to articulate these 
two sources of knowledge, by affording pupils opportunities to use IR to cope with problem 
situations, while at the same time instilling discipline-related concepts (Karpov, 2013).
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HOW DOES INDUCTIVE REASONING DEVELOP?
We now know that children start implicitly producing inductive inferences at a very early 
age, as Schulz, Goodman, Tenenbaum, and Jenkins (2008) have demonstrated. In the initial 
phase of their experiment, these authors showed preschoolers colored building blocks that 
sometimes emitted a sound when they came into contact with each other, instantiating spe-
cific, but arbitrary, causal relations (e.g., when a blue block came into contact with a red one, 
it made a train noise, and when a yellow block came into contact with a blue one, it produced 
the sound of a siren). In the second phase, the children were introduced to a novel block that 
contradicted the rules that had hitherto governed the outcome of different block contact com-
binations. As early as 4 years, children recognized when abstract rules had been violated and 
sought a coherent causal explanation.
These early inferences seem to be modulated by the same variables as they are in adults. 
For instance, one of the known triggers of inductive generalization is the number of obser-
vations: The larger our sample of observations, the more likely we are to risk inferring the 
existence of an underlying general rule. Lawson and Fisher (2009) demonstrated that in favor-
able conditions, sample size can be seen to have an effect on inference production as early as 
5 years. More generally, their results (Lawson & Fisher, 2011) suggest that children’s inductive 
inferences, like those of adults, are extremely sensitive to the regularity of the observed phe-
nomena. However, from a purely logical stance, our inductive inferences can be systemati-
cally questioned: Even when grounded on multiple and consistent observations, the available 
evidence could always support alternative interpretations based on new concepts and justify 
alternative projections. The fact that some inferences appear more “natural” than others de-
spite their logical equivalence is a long-lasting theoretical issue (known as the new riddle of 
induction) for both philosophers (Goodman, 1955) and psychologists (Sternberg, 1983).
Although the basic inductive mechanisms appear to emerge at a fairly young age, IR 
becomes noticeably more efficient with age. When Csapó (Csapó, 1997; Molnár et al., 2013) 
administered a battery of inductive tests (number and verbal series, verbal and number analo-
gies, exclusion, etc.) to children in a series of cross-sectional studies, he observed a substan-
tial improvement, leading him to conclude that “inductive reasoning develops during a broad 
age range and that the developmental process covers the whole period of elementary and 
secondary education” (Csapó, 1997, p. 623). Furthermore, correlations between performances 
on the different tests suggested that comparable processes were implemented to solve the 
problems. Composite IR scores derived from these tests were predictive both of knowledge 
acquired a year later (thus confirming the contribution of IR to the development of crystal-
lized intelligence) and of progress in problem solving (thus confirming the contribution of IR 
to the development of fluid intelligence).
These data establishing the extent and impact of IR development raise the question of 
exactly how this development occurs. In the following sections, I therefore list the various 
possible contributing factors. I illustrate the contribution of each one to IR development in 
terms of its impact on performances on the RPM test.
The Relational Shift
As we saw earlier, IR is closely associated with the ability of the human mind to grasp rela-
tions and systems of relations. According to Gentner (1988), children’s cognitive development 
is characterized by a radical shift in this area. Although their attention is initially drawn to 
Copyright © Springer Publishing Company, LLC
394 Perret
perceptual similarities between objects (e.g., conceiving that a ball is red in the same way that 
an apple is red), they later graduate from appearance similarity to relational similarity (e.g., 
conceiving that a ball is on the table in the same way that a book is on the desk). This rela-
tional shift sets the path for the development of analogical reasoning: Analogy entails finding 
a structural alignment in which the key similarities lie in relations between elements, more 
than in the features of objects. However, Gentner’s hypothesis has been widely discussed in 
the wake of a set of studies indicating that children as young as 3 or 4 years can take account 
of relational analogies, providing that the conditions in which the problems are presented 
favor their detection (see Goswami, 2010, for a summary). Rattermann and Gentner (1998) 
then posited that the perceptual-to-relational shift should not be viewed as a transition be-
tween two universal, age-defined developmental stages but as a sequence that is reiterated 
in each separate knowledge domain. According to these authors, children are only able to go 
beyond their initial focus on object properties to take relational similarities on board once 
they have acquired a degree of expertise and mastered the necessary concepts. More recently, 
Bulloch and Opfer (2009) have suggested that developmental improvements in resolving in-
ductive reasoning problems reflect not just greater ease in considering relations per se but 
also, and above all, greater flexibility and sensitivity to the validity of surface versus structural 
cues, depending on which form of similarity is most relevant in the given situation.
RPM success, for instance, depends on being able to alternate between appearance simi-
larities in some items and relational similarities in others. The hierarchy of matrix difficulty is 
itself compatible with the perceptual-to-relational shift hypothesis in that the simplest items 
(i.e., those that can be successfully resolved by young children) require participants to com-
plete perceptual patterns or recognize the constancy of different shape attributes, whereas the 
most complex items (i.e., those that can only be successfully resolved by older children) rely 
on relational analogies (e.g., rules of distribution or quantitative progression).
The Development of Relational Processing Ability
The theory of relational complexity developed by Halford and colleagues (Halford, Wilson, 
& Phillips, 1998, 2010) implies that the ability to process relations in WM is another major 
contributing factor to progress in IR. When a child has to resolve a problem that requires fluid 
intelligence, the relational schemas needed to grasp the problem structure are elaborated 
in WM.
According to Halford’s theory, it is processing capacity of WM that determines the degree 
of relational complexity the mind is able to represent. This complexity can be defined by the 
number of variables that interact within a given relational system and must therefore be 
processed in parallel within the same mental model. By looking at the number of variables 
that have to be represented simultaneously, we can therefore determine the level of relational 
complexity. Halford’s theory states that fourth-order relations represent the highest level of 
complexity the human mind can cope with. Halford, Baker, McCredden, and Bain (2005) 
explored the limits of human processing capacity by asking adult participants to interpret sta-
tistical interactions featuring increasing numbers of variables. Participants had to complete 
the final sentence of a verbal description with the term that most appropriately described the 
data presented in a graphical representation of the interaction. Results showed that when 
the problem required more than four variables to be processed simultaneously, participants’ 
performances ceased to be above chance level.
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In children, relational complexity theory predicts a gradual increase in processing ca-
pacity along the following developmental timeline: The ability to process relations involving 
a single variable is thought to emerge at around 1 year, the processing of binary relations 
around 2 years, and that of ternary relations around 5 years, whereas the median age for the 
ability to process quaternary relations is 11 years. This steady rise in the number of variables 
that children can handle within a single representation is thought to increase the scope and 
complexity of the concepts they can master. It is also believed to extend the reasoning they 
can bring to bear by enabling them to base their inferences on increasingly complex mental 
models that mirror the relational systems at work in the problems they have to solve.
One of the main sources of variation in RPM difficulty is precisely the number of rules that 
have to be combined to grasp the overall structure and construct a representation of the miss-
ing shape (Carpenter, Just, & Shell, 1990). In support of this hypothesis, Dauvier, Bailleux, and 
Perret (2014) recently demonstrated that the effect of age on RPM performances is partly me-
diated by improvements in relational processing capacity in WM. Furthermore, the task these 
authors developed to assess relational integration capacity in children (Relational Integration 
Level Assessment Task [RILAT]) proved to be more predictive of RPM performance than clas-
sic WM tasks (such as the Backward Digit-Span Task), which primarily assess storage capacity 
(Perret, Dauvier, Bailleux, & Thomachot, 2013).
Strategic Development
Owing to our limited WM capacity, our ability to deal with complex problems partly depends 
on the strategies we adopt to sidestep that complexity. For instance, segmentation strategies 
(Halford et al., 1998) consist in breaking the task down into several steps, none of which 
exceeds the individual’s processing capacity. This means that the relational system no lon-
ger has to be grasped in its entirety but can be understood piecemeal, in several successive, 
manageable segments.
So central is this strategic dimension to our cognitive functioning that it lies at the core of recent 
models of development. For Siegler (1996, 2000), learning and development processes are 
subtended by overlapping waves of strategy use through the discovery of new strategies, more 
frequent use of the most effective strategies, or increasingly efficient strategy implementa-
tion. In Siegler’s model, development is not conceived of as a series of abrupt changes in the 
way that children grasp a problem situation but rather as gradual increases or decreases in 
the probability of mobilizing strategies that can coexist in a child’s mind. Furthermore, mi-
crogenetic studies have revealed that these gradual changes sometimes take place implicitly, 
with children adopting a new approach to a problem situation without being fully aware they 
are using a new strategy (e.g., Siegler & Stern, 1998).
As far as IR is concerned, Whitebread (1996) showed that improved performances on a 
discrimination-learning task, where children had to identify a rule by analyzing its invari-
ants, were associated with a gradual transformation in the strategies participants used to test 
their hypotheses. Research on the factors that contribute to effective RPM resolution has also 
helped to shed light on this strategic dimension. Snow (1980) identified a constructive match-
ing strategy that consists in mentally preparing an ideal response and then comparing it with 
the responses that are actually available and an elimination strategy that consists in compar-
ing the features of the matrix elements with those of the possible responses, thus arriving 
at a default response through a process of elimination. By analyzing response times coupled 
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with eye movements, Vigneau, Caissie, and Bors (2006) were able to confirm that individual 
variations in RPM efficiency are closely linked to these strategic factors: Participants with the 
best performances spent proportionately more time analyzing the matrix than they did ana-
lyzing the response options and strategically varied the amount of time spent on each item as 
a function of its perceived complexity.
The Development of Inhibitory Control
The age-related improvement in the inhibitory control of thoughts is another general factor 
that is often mentioned. Here, the term inhibition refers to the active process of suppress-
ing interfering representations in WM. Given the structural limitations of WM capacity, 
it is vital to keep a tight control of resources, only allocating them to the most relevant 
informations. Inhibition is therefore given a key role in several general models of cogni-
tive development (e.g., Bjorklund & Harnishfeger, 1990), for in problem-solving situations, 
the representations elaborated in WM are often guided either by salient information in 
the perceptual environment or else by familiar strategies triggered by the context. Many 
Piagetian tasks, for instance, set traps for children, who therefore have not only to apply 
logical-mathematical knowledge but also to inhibit the processing of the problem’s mislead-
ing dimensions (Houdé, 2000). Improved performances may therefore reflect not just the 
enhancement of the logical skills elicited by these tasks but also greater inhibitory control 
of thoughts (Dempster, 1991).
The contribution of inhibitory control to IR development has mainly been explored in 
studies of analogical reasoning. Morrison, Doumas, and Richland (2011) used a neurally in-
spired computer model to show that an improvement in the inhibition level of the model’s 
WM system could help to explain the progress in children’s ability to resist distraction from 
perceptual similarities in favor of relation-based reasoning. In an extension of this hypoth-
esis, Thibaut, French, and Vezneva (2010) reported that between the ages of 6 and 14 years, 
children performing an analogical reasoning test become increasingly successful in resisting 
the perceptual distractors introduced into the response options to compete with relational 
matches. In other words, the age-related increase in IR effectiveness may rest on the parallel 
development of the ability to abstract relations and the ability to inhibit the processing of sur-
face information that often hinders this abstraction. Furthermore, at the other end of the lifes-
pan, results of the study by Viskontas, Morrison, Holyoak, Hummel, and Knowlton (2004) 
suggest that the decline in IR associated with cognitive aging may be the consequence of a 
comparable interaction between inhibitory functions and relational processing.
RPM resolution is also subject to interference of this sort. Some response options are more 
distracting than others, accounting for the most frequent errors reported in the test manual. 
According to Jarosz and Wiley (2012), the correlation that is regularly observed between RPM 
and WM test performances could be linked to the fact that both types of test rely on the ability 
to manage attentional resources and resist interference. By experimentally manipulating the 
degree of interference for each item (i.e., adding or subtracting the most frequently selected 
incorrect responses), the authors showed that the presence of salient distractors has the great-
est impact on participants with the poorest WM performances. An additional analysis of eye 
movements revealed that the participants with the best WM performances were not only bet-
ter able to resist the highly distracting incorrect responses but were also more likely to adopt 
a constructive matching strategy.
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Metalogical Development
Metalogical development refers to improvements in children’s epistemological understand-
ing that their knowledge (and that of others) can be generated by different types of cognitive 
activity (e.g., perception, remembering, forgetting, reasoning, strategy use). The empirical 
studies conducted by Pillow (e.g., Pillow & Pearson, 2012) reveal a marked age-related im-
provement in this conception of the mind as an active system of knowledge construction. If 
we take the example of the distinction between guesswork, deduction, and inductive infer-
ence, although children can acknowledge that deduction is superior to guesswork as early as 
5–6 years, the explicit comprehension of inductive processes is more complex and is achieved 
far later, mainly because children first have to recognize that knowledge can be uncertain.
As we saw earlier, Moshman’s (1995, 2004) model assumes that improvements in chil-
dren’s reasoning affect not only the complexity of their inferences but also their level of meta-
cognitive awareness. In turn, this growing awareness affords children more rigorous control 
over the inferences they make. Moshman claims that social interactions can encourage the 
self-reflective activity that supports metalogical development because they force children to 
justify their inferences and accept the notion that different trains of thought can lead their in-
terlocutors to different conclusions. Age-related improvements in IR may therefore be partly 
subtended by an increasingly acute awareness of the inferential processes that are brought 
into play, which at the same time promotes their regulation and generalization.
During RPM resolution, this awareness may result in an increasingly explicit identifica-
tion of the inferences used to resolve the matrices. When Carpenter et al. (1990) analyzed 
the RPM matrices, they discovered that despite their apparent diversity, the transformations 
undergone by the figures were governed by just five very general rules: constant in a row, 
quantitative pairwise progression, figure addition or subtraction, distribution of two values, 
and distribution of three values. We can assume that the better participants become at iden-
tifying these metarules, the easier they find it to apply specific rules to specific matrices. 
In line with this hypothesis, by experimentally manipulating the order in which the items 
were presented, Verguts and De Boeck (2002) were able to show that participants clearly 
do better when they have already resolved items using a comparable rule. More recently, 
Wiley, Jarosz, Cushen, and Colflesh (2011) found that WM capacity is most closely correlated 
with individual differences when items require the discovery of a new combination of rules. 
The identification of a metarule appears to makes its transposition to subsequent items both 
more probable and less cognitively costly. Meanwhile, adopting a dynamic assessment per-
spective, Carlson and Wiedl (1979, 1992) observed an improvement in RPM performances 
when conditions favored inferential awareness (i.e., by asking the children to verbalize their 
reasoning—thinking aloud—during the task and justify their inference after choosing one 
of the responses).
Changes in Thinking Dispositions
Dispositions are relatively stable psychological tendencies that allow us to differentiate be-
tween the functioning of different individuals. Insofar as we are allowed choices in our daily 
lives, these personal inclinations guide those choices in a relatively coherent manner. The 
notion of disposition (or trait) is a familiar one to psychologists investigating socioemotional 
functioning or personality development. Research by Perkins and colleagues (Perkins, 1995; 
Perkins, Tishman, Ritchart, Donis, & Andrade, 2000) has shown that this concept can also 
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help us understand variations in the effectiveness of intellectual functioning. His central 
argument is that implementing intelligent behavior requires not only intellectual aptitude 
but also the ability to detect occasions for thinking (i.e., sensitivity) and the motivation to make 
and control rigorous inferences (i.e., inclination). Variations in the ability or willingness to 
explore a problem situation in depth, test hypotheses, adopt a strategic attitude, take on board 
several perspectives, or tolerate uncertainty may not only help to explain individual differ-
ences but also drive age-related improvements in reasoning.
Reasoning is an optional process that is extremely costly in terms of cognitive effort. 
This means that individuals only fully engage in it if they are acutely aware of its expected 
benefits and have developed appropriate epistemological values. Kokis, Macpherson, Toplak, 
West, and Stanovich (2002) looked at whether children aged 10–11 years and 13 years en-
gaged in heuristic (intuitive) or in analytic processing to resolve problems involving induc-
tive, deductive, and probabilistic reasoning. Results highlighted an age-related increase in 
analytic responding. The study’s independent variables included measures of cognitive abil-
ity and thinking dispositions. Consistent with Perkins’ proposals, results of the regression 
analyses showed that thinking dispositions explained a specific proportion of variance in 
analytic responding after controlling for variance shared with cognitive ability.
RPM resolution is obviously sensitive to thinking dispositions. Implementing a construc-
tive matching strategy involves processing systems of relations that increase in complexity 
across the items, forcing participants to mobilize considerable WM resources. In the test 
manual, Raven, Raven, and Court (1998) highlight this dispositional dimension, claiming 
that one of the main sources of error is the reluctance to devote mental energy to resolv-
ing abstract problems. Vodegel-Matzen, van der Molen, and Dudink (1994) found that high-
scoring individuals typically spent more time on resolving the RPM items than low scorers. 
In a similar vein, Kagan, Pearson, and Welch (1966) had previously highlighted the influence 
of cognitive style (impulsive vs. reflective) on IR test performances.
FOSTERING THE DEVELOPMENT OF INDUCTIVE REASONING
“We can debate the exact nature of the process, but few would refute the claim that it is 
through application and practice that reasoning skills improve” (Kuhn, Katz, & Dean, 2004, 
p. 197).
Because they apply across a wide range of contexts, inductive processes are prime tar-
gets for cognitive education interventions designed to foster the development of children’s 
adaptive resources. Not only is IR a lever for constructing subject knowledge (e.g., through 
the discovery of the rules that govern language structure or number relations) but the ever 
increasing complexity and diversification of information sources in today’s world means 
that it is also vital to possess rigorous inductive processes if—to paraphrase Raven et al. 
(1998)—we are to “extract meaning from chaos.” For instance, children’s ability to master 
the new technological devices that now play such an important part in their lives relies 
mainly on their ability to use induction to fathom out the systems of arbitrary rules on 
which they are based.
Several intervention studies have empirically demonstrated that it is possible to enhance 
the efficiency of IR. The studies conducted by Nisbett and colleagues (Nisbett, Fong, Lehman, 
& Cheng, 1987, for a review) provided evidence that (a) reasoning skills of college students 
can be trained and that (b) training effects can transfer to a wide range of problem contents. 
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Those results, which contradicted the view of human cognition as inherently domain specific, 
also set the path for a reasonably optimistic perspective regarding the cognitive education 
of reasoning (Nisbett, 2009). The work of de Koning, Hamers, Sijtsma, and Vermeer (2002) 
further indicates that it is possible to educate IR processes in school-age children, through 
specially designed activities. In the following sections, I give examples of three such meth-
ods, showing how they promote the main factors for progress identified in developmental 
psychology research.
Fostering the Relational Shift: The Example of the Transformation Box
As we have seen, IR is based on the processing of relations. Presumably, therefore, it can only 
be implemented by individuals who can look beyond surface similarities and focus instead on 
relational similarities. This attentional switch encourages children to form representations of 
general rules or A:B:C:D-type analogies. According to Paour (1995), “the abstraction of arbi-
trary relations is the most common and most familiar manifestation of intelligence at work” 
(p. 267). He therefore designed a device intended to promote the abstraction of relations: the 
Transformation Box (Paour, 1992).
This is essentially a large box with four holes in the top. Children can insert objects or 
pictures of objects into these holes, which are said to “transform” objects. Of course, no actual 
magic is involved: At the back of the box, the adult substitutes a new object for the one the 
child has introduced, but because of the way the box is designed, the substitution looks like 
a transformation. Each hole corresponds to a hatch from which the substituted object can be 
retrieved (Figure 2). The transformations are systematic, in that each hole is associated with 
a general rule that the adult has to follow (e.g., changing the object’s color, shape, or size; 
FIGURE 2. Illustration showing how the Transformation Box works.
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modifying its orientation or texture, in either an absolute or a relative way). Children first 
have to work out “how each hole works” through experience. They then have to anticipate the 
outcome of hypothetical transformations based on the rules they have managed to abstract 
(“Given the rule for this hole, what will the result be if we insert a particular object?”). In real 
life, relations are not only general but also omnidirectional, in that they can work in different 
ways (Halford et al., 1998), so we can also reverse the anticipation (“Given what I know about 
how this hole works, what object do I have to insert to obtain a particular result?”). The third 
and final phase consists in getting the children to coordinate a series of transformations 
to move from one state to another. This is a genuine problem-solving situation, in that the 
children have to make planned use of the systems of relations they discovered during the 
exploratory phase to achieve a goal.
By encouraging children to focus their attention on relational invariants from which they 
can abstract a general rule, the Transformation Box directly operationalizes the promotion of 
the relational shift. It also elegantly embodies Leech et al.’s (2007) postulate that the mind 
mainly conceives of relations as transformational systems. Up to now, research on the effects 
of training with the Transformation Box has focused on groups of children with intellectual 
disability (Paour, 1992). An intervention study comparing 22 children with a mental age of 
4–7 years and a control group that received the same number of individual training sessions 
revealed a significant effect on RPM performances in a posttest conducted 4 months after the 
intervention had ended (effect size not reported). These encouraging results for children with 
intellectual disability suggest that it might be useful to extend the study of training effects to 
typically developing children.
Fostering Relational Integration: The Example of Relevant Playful Activities
Play situations can potentially offer occasions for developing general intellectual skills that 
are just as beneficial as cognitive education methods. Hessels-Schlatter (2010) claims that 
play helps children to see the advantages of adopting efficient processing strategies, whereas 
transposing these strategies to different games helps to generalize them. Moreover, the de-
fense mechanisms that characterize failing schoolchildren’s attitudes to learning are less sa-
lient in these situations. As such, games provide an opportunity for modifying children’s 
attributional beliefs (i.e., the way they interpret their successes and failures in terms of effort 
and strategy use). This can only take place, however, once the cognitive processes needed 
to solve them have been analyzed to select the ones that most closely match the objective 
being pursued.
As we saw earlier, relational integration is one of the potential factors for IR develop-
ment. Relational integration refers to the ability to represent the interaction of several 
variables within a coordinated system. Mackey, Hill, Stone, and Bunge (2011) recently 
carried out an intervention study with children aged 7–10 years that focused on precisely 
this dimension of cognitive functioning. The children in the experimental group under-
went 16 sessions, each lasting 75 min, during which they were given the opportunity to 
practice 12 different games, all of which required several relations or rules to be coordi-
nated. For example, the Set game consists in carefully examining 12 cards that can vary in 
four dimensions: symbol, color, number, and shading. The aim of the game is to form a 
set of three cards that are either totally identical to or totally different from each other on 
each of the four dimensions. The nature of each card that is selected therefore constrains 
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the choice of the following cards and sets up an interaction between the different dimen-
sions that have to be simultaneously taken into account. In this study, a control group 
underwent a comparable period of intensive training but featuring different games that 
required high information processing speed and rapid responses but were based on very 
simple rules. Speed, for instance, is a game that manipulates the same dimensions as 
Set, but the aim is to shed one’s cards as quickly as possible by adding them to a central 
stack. There is just one rule: the card must have something in common with the top card 
in the stack.
IR was assessed with the Test of Nonverbal Intelligence (3rd edition; TONI-3) before and 
after the training. This matrix completion test probes analogical reasoning processes similar 
to those required by RPM items. Results revealed a significant improvement in the scores of 
the children in the relational integration training group (Cohen’s d 5 1.51) but not in those 
belonging to the processing speed group.
Fostering Strategic and Metalogical Regulation of Inferences:  
The Developmental Program of Inductive Reasoning
Aware of the centrality of IR in hierarchical models of intellectual functioning, Klauer and 
Phye (1994) came up with one of the most advanced programs for promoting its develop-
ment in children. They defined IR as the discovery of regularities through the detection of 
similarities, differences, or a combination of the two with respect to either object attributes 
or relations between objects. This definition allowed them to clearly identify the different 
categories of problems in which this mode of thought is involved and thus to establish a tax-
onomy of inductive problems based on these two dimensions (i.e., attributes vs. relations and 
similarities vs. differences; Table 1).
The Developmental Program of Inductive Reasoning comprises 120 problems (20 per 
category) in various information formats: pictorial, geometric, verbal, and numerical. The 
program has a twofold objective. First, the child must identify the nature of the problem being 
posed and form an explicit representation of the category it belongs to (i.e., the program’s 
metalogical component). Second, he or she must tackle each problem situation in an analytic 
way, systematically undertaking an exhaustive comparison of the elements (i.e., the program’s 
strategic dimension).
Tomic and Kingma (1998) studied the effects of this program in 23 6-year-olds, who un-
derwent 10 training sessions, each lasting 30 min. A control group of same-age children of 
comparable intellectual level performed tasks from the regular school curriculum. The au-
thors observed a significant effect of training on performances on the Colored RPM in a 
posttest administered 4 months after the end of training (effect size not reported). Another 
recent study (Molnár, 2011) explored the effect of this program (10 sessions lasting 20 min, 
spread over an 8-week period) in 90 children aged 6–8 years. The pre- and posttests featured 
six categories of problems inspired by Klauer and Phye’s (1994) taxonomy. The effects were 
noteworthy not just for their size (Cohen’s d 5 1.12) but also for their duration (a significant 
difference between the control group and the experimental group could still be observed 
in a follow-up study 1 year after the training had finished). Moreover, the training effect 
remained stable regardless of the children’s original IR level established in the pretest. The 
greatest effects observed in the posttest were for problems involving the coordination of 
relational similarities and differences, that is, matrix problems comparable to RPM items. 
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Other intervention studies conducted by the program’s authors (for a review, see Klauer & 
Phye, 2008) have highlighted its effects directly on RPM performances, even among children 
with mild intellectual disability and, at the other end of the spectrum, among intellectually 
gifted children.
IMPLICATIONS AND PERSPECTIVES
In the first half of this article, I argued that IR is one of the decisive ingredients of human 
intelligence. For Hofstadter (2001), this fundamental ability to abstract relations through 
the detection of regularities represents “the very blue that fills the whole sky of cognition” 
(p. 499). I also argued that attempts to promote IR are more likely to succeed if they are based 
on the vectors for change identified by researchers. Studies in the field of developmental psy-
chology are painting an increasingly well-documented picture of the factors that contribute 
to IR. The three training methods described earlier illustrate how knowledge of these factors 
can be used to design targeted programs. I selected these three examples not only because 
they have started to bring results but also because the authors of these programs rooted their 
design in explicit developmental hypotheses. Having such a limited selection means that 
although I was able to highlight some of the factors that can inform intervention programs 
(i.e., relational shift, relational integration, strategic and metalogical development), I neces-
sarily neglected others, such as inhibition processes, the ability to maintain information in 
WM, and thinking dispositions. These factors also deserve to be taken into account not only 
by program designers but also by psychologists seeking to identify and overcome the obsta-
cles that some children encounter.
Inhibitory control is a key executive function, regulating thought and behavior. By en-
abling children to suspend their most impulsive reactions, it gives them space to reflect on 
social or cognitive situations. Several studies have begun to look into the possibility of giving 
children general inhibition training and examine its impact on reasoning (Rueda, Rothbart, 
Saccamanno, & Posner, 2005; Thorell, Lindqvist, Bergman Nutley, Bohlin, & Klingberg, 2009). 
It is worth noting, however, that improvements in inhibitory control are themselves contin-
gent on progress in metalogical understanding. For children to actively inhibit an inefficient 
strategy or interfering information in reasoning situations, they must first see a good reason 
TABLE 1. Klauer and Phye’s Taxonomy of Inductive Reasoning Problems
Cognitive Processes Types of Problems
Object attributes
Detecting similarities Class formation
Detecting differences Identifying irregularities
Coordinating similarities and differences Cross classification
Relations between objects
Detecting similarities Simple analogies, series completion
Detecting differences Identifying disrupted series
Coordinating similarities and differences Matrices
Note. From Cognitive Training for Children: A Developmental Program of Inductive Reasoning 
and Problem Solving by K. J. Klauer and G. D. Phye, 1994, Seattle, WA: Hogrefe. Copyright (1994) by 
Hogrefe Publishing. Adopted with permission.
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for doing so. In experimental tasks designed to measure inhibition levels, such as the Stroop 
(1935) test, this metalogical dimension is neutralized because participants are explicitly told 
what they must not do. In ecologically valid reasoning situations, by contrast, the decision 
to inhibit a given strategy is up to the child and therefore presupposes prior recognition of 
its inappropriate nature. Inhibition training (for a review, see Diamond & Lee, 2011) might 
nonetheless reinforce a general disposition for effortful control, which favors the adoption of 
more reflective attitudes in problem solving (Rothbart & Rueda, 2005).
In my discussion of WM influence, I emphasized its relational integration component. 
There is both theoretical (Halford & Andrews, 2006) and empirical (Oberauer, Süb, Wilhem, 
& Whittmann, 2008) reason to think that processing capacity exerts the greatest constraint 
on the development of reasoning. However, WM is a space not only for processing but also 
for the temporary storage of information, and most WM assessments take the form of span 
measures. Regular observations of close correlations between these storage measures and 
measures of fluid intelligence have recently prompted the marketing of WM training pro-
grams and a clear increase in intervention studies. Despite the proliferation of studies and 
even meta-analyses, it has so far proved difficult to identify the conditions in which WM train-
ing is most likely to lead to transfer effects in reasoning tasks (Cowan, 2014; Shipstead, Hicks, 
& Engle, 2012). Although WM training holds out promising prospects, I suspect that it has 
been the focus of excessive interest. The hierarchical organization of the Cattell-Horn-Carroll 
model (Carroll, 1993) suggests that if our aim is to foster the development of reasoning and 
fluid intelligence, we would be better off giving children training in inferential processes 
themselves. To illustrate, in one recent and particularly well-controlled study (Bergman 
Nutley et al., 2011), the authors compared the effects of different types of training on 4-year-
olds: progressively difficult training in nonverbal reasoning versus progressively difficult WM 
training. A control group was trained in the same tasks but remained at the lowest level of 
difficulty. The authors explored the effect of these types of training on a range of cognitive 
functions, including fluid intelligence, which was measured as a latent variable derived from 
several tests (including the Colored RPM). Only the group that was specifically trained in 
nonverbal reasoning displayed a significant improvement in the fluid intelligence latent vari-
able on the posttest (Cohen’s d 5 0.63 on Set B of the Colored RPM). Conversely, improved 
WM performances were only found in the group that had been trained in WM.
Thinking dispositions have been defined as sensitivity to thinking occasions and inclina-
tion to engage in controlled and justifiable inferential processes. It would be difficult to devise 
a training program for thinking dispositions per se. Nevertheless, unless children’s thinking 
dispositions can be stimulated, it is pointless hoping for the transfer and generalization of 
cognitive education methods: “We may experience varying degrees of success in undertaking 
to teach students to reason well, but doing so is to no avail unless they believe it is important to 
do so [emphasis added]” (Kuhn, 2013, p. 760). For both Moshman (2004) and Kuhn (2013), 
changes in the way that children understand potential reasoning situations mainly occur in 
social interactions, when children have to justify their inferential approach: “When reason-
ing is situated in a social context, it undergoes scrutiny from multiple perspectives that acts 
as a catalyst for deeper processing and change” (Kuhn, 2013, p. 760). Feuerstein’s pioneering 
work highlighted both the centrality of IR and the social origins of its refinements. The in-
struments that he developed (Feuerstein, Feuerstein, Falik, & Rand, 2002; Feuerstein, Rand, 
Hoffman, & Miller, 1980) clearly focused on induction as one of the key processes by which 
problems are solved. Moreover, the theory of structural cognitive modifiability envisaged 
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social interactions, taking the form of mediated learning experiences or collaborative learning 
experiences, as proximal factors for the actualization of potentialities. The methods used to 
promote IR that I have described here (e.g., the Transformation Box or Klauer and Phye’s 
program) do not simply expose children to problem situations. Instead, they set up oppor-
tunities for the children to interact with a mediating adult, who asks them about what they 
are doing, refrains their impulses, requires logical justifications, and praises the efforts they 
make. Thinking dispositions can be likened to a system of cognitive values, such as the de-
sire to undertake rigorous, in-depth information processing before validating an inference. 
They are culturally transmitted in social experiences where adults interpret the reasons for 
the children’s performances, gradually structuring their attributional belief system (Yeager 
& Dweck, 2012). To illustrate, in the area of IR, the disposition to compare could become a 
target for early intervention. Indeed, the comparison process is the main lever for abstract-
ing relations (Markman & Gentner, 2001). According to Klauer, the surest way of discovering 
regularities amid all the apparent chaos is to adopt a top–down strategy of systematic and 
analytic comparison. However, as Haywood points out in the design of his cognitive early 
education program (Brooks & Haywood, 2003), inequalities between children are less to do 
with their ability to compare (a relatively straightforward process) than with their tendency to 
engage in spontaneous comparative behavior. The sensitivity and inclination to compare is 
the product of mediated learning experiences where this valuable cognitive attitude is pre-
sented in a positive light.
The main aim of this article was to show how knowledge of the factors for development 
identified by researchers can inform program design and guide adults’ mediation strategies. 
The opposite is equally true. The scientific community is increasingly recognizing that inter-
vention studies are a valuable method for overcoming problems in the causal interpretation 
of developmental correlational data (e.g., Zelazo, 2013). From this perspective, the challenge 
is not only to undertake double-blind randomized studies but also to delimit the cognitive 
processes that are elicited as clearly as possible to correctly attribute the effects that are ob-
served. I should stress, however, that this need for parsimony applies to intervention studies 
conducted with a research goal in mind but not to interventions themselves. On the practi-
cal front, clinical and educational psychologists have every interest in using all the sources 
of improvement at their disposal (e.g., combining several training programs; getting the 
children to play games that require the coordination of relations; encouraging them to make 
comparisons whenever the occasion presents itself; praising them for adopting a system-
atic, strategic attitude; giving them a taste for intellectual effort) rather than placing all their 
hopes in a single method predicated on a single hypothetical key process. As this review has 
sought to show, IR development is the result of a myriad of influences interacting over time.
REFERENCES
Bergman Nutley, S., Söderqvist, S., Bryde, S., Thorell, L. B., Humphreys, K., & Klingberg, T. (2011). 
Gains in fluid intelligence after non-verbal reasoning training in 4-year-old children—A controlled, 
randomized study. Developmental Science, 14, 591–601.
Bjorklund, D. F., & Harnishfeger, K. K. (1990). The resources construct in cognitive development: 
Diverse sources of evidence and a theory of inefficient inhibition. Developmental Review, 10, 48–71.
Brooks, P. H., & Haywood, H. C. (2003). A preschool mediational context: The Bright Start curricu-
lum. In A. S.-H. Seng, L. K.-H. Pou, & O.-S. Tan (Eds.), Mediated learning experience with children: 
Applications across contexts (pp. 98–132). Singapore: McGraw-Hill Education.
Copyright © Springer Publishing Company, LLC
Children’s Inductive Reasoning 405
Bulloch, M. J., & Opfer, J. E. (2009). What makes relational reasoning smart? Revisiting the relational 
shift in cognitive development. Developmental Science, 12, 114–122.
Carlson, J. S., & Wiedl, K. H. (1979). Toward a differential testing approach: Testing-the-limits employ-
ing the Raven matrices. Intelligence, 3, 323–344.
Carlson, J. S., & Wiedl, K. H. (1992). The dynamic assessment of intelligence. In H. C. Haywood & D. 
Tzuriel (Eds.), Interactive assessment (pp. 167–186). Berlin, Germany: Springer Verlag.
Carpenter, P. A., Just, M. A., & Shell, P. (1990). What one intelligence test measures: A theoreti-
cal account of the processing in the Raven Progressive Matrices Test. Psychological Review, 97, 
404–431.
Carroll, J. B. (1993). Human cognitive abilities: A survey of factor analytic studies. New York, NY: Cambridge 
University Press.
Cook, C., Goodman, N. D., & Schulz, L. E. (2011). Where science starts: Spontaneous experiments in 
preschoolers’ exploratory play. Cognition, 120, 341–349.
Cowan, N. (2014). Working memory underpins cognitive development, learning, and education. 
Educational Psychology Review, 26, 197–223.
Csapó, B. (1997). The development of inductive reasoning: Cross-sectional assessments in an educa-
tional context. International Journal of Behavioral Development, 20, 609–626.
Dauvier, B., Bailleux, C., & Perret, P. (2014). The development of relational integration during child-
hood. Developmental Psychology, 50, 1687–1697.
de Koning, E., Hamers, J. H. M., Sijtsma, K., & Vermeer, A. (2002). Teaching and transfer of inductive 
reasoning in primary education. Developmental Review, 22, 211–241.
Dempster, F. N. (1991). Inhibitory processes: A neglected dimension of intelligence. Intelligence, 15, 
157–173.
Diamond, A., & Lee, K. (2011). Interventions shown to aid executive function development in children 
4 to 12 years old. Science, 333, 959–964.
Evans, J. S. (2008). Dual-processing accounts of reasoning, judgment, and social cognition. Annual 
Review of Psychology, 59, 255–278.
Feeney, A., & Heit, E. (2007). Inductive reasoning: Experimental, developmental, and computational ap-
proaches. Cambridge, NY: Cambridge University Press.
Feuerstein, R., Feuerstein, R. S., Falik, L. H., & Rand, Y. (2002). The dynamic assessment of cognitive 
modifiability: The learning propensity assessment device, theory, instruments, and techniques. Jerusalem, 
Israel: International Centre for the Enhancement of Learning Potential Press.
Feuerstein, R., Rand, Y., Hoffman, M. B., & Miller, R. (1980). Instrumental enrichment: An intervention 
program for cognitive modifiability. Baltimore, MD: University Park Press.
Galotti, K. M., Komatsu, L. K., & Voelz, S. (1997). Children’s differential performance on deductive and 
inductive syllogisms. Developmental Psychology, 33, 70–78.
Gentner, D. (1988). Metaphor as structure mapping: The relational shift. Child Development, 59, 47–59.
Gentner, D., & Holyoak, K. J. (1997). Reasoning and learning by analogy. The American Psychologist, 
52, 32–34.
Goel, V., & Dolan, R. J. (2004). Differential involvement of left prefrontal cortex in inductive and deduc-
tive reasoning. Cognition, 93, B109–B121.
Goodman, N. (1955). Fact, fiction, and forecast. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
Gopnik, A., & Wellman, H. (1994). The theory-theory. In L. Hirschfeld & S. Gelman (Eds.), Map-
ping the mind: Domain specificity in cognition and culture (pp. 257–293). New York, NY: Cambridge 
University Press.
Goswami, U. (Ed.). (2010). Inductive and deductive reasoning. In The Wiley-Blackwell handbook of child-
hood cognitive development (pp. 399–419). London, United Kingdom: Wiley.
Halford, G. S., & Andrews, G. (2006). Reasoning and problem solving. In W. Damon, R. Lerner, D. 
Kuhn, & R. S. Siegler (Eds.), Handbook of child psychology: Vol. 2. Cognition, perception, and language 
(6th ed., pp. 557–608). Hoboken, NJ: Wiley.
Copyright © Springer Publishing Company, LLC
406 Perret
Halford, G. S., Baker, R., McCredden, J. E., & Bain, J. D. (2005). How many variables can humans 
process? Psychological Science, 16, 70–76.
Halford, G. S., Wilson, W. H., & Phillips, S. (1998). Processing capacity defined by relational complexity: 
Implications for comparative, developmental, and cognitive psychology. The Behavioral and Brain 
Sciences, 21, 803–865.
Halford, G. S., Wilson, W. H., & Phillips, S. (2010). Relational knowledge: The foundation of higher 
cognition. Trends in Cognitive Sciences, 14, 497–505.
Heit, E. (2007). What is induction and why study it? In A. Feeney & E. Heit (Eds.), Inductive reasoning: 
Experimental, developmental, and computational approaches (pp. 1–24). New York, NY: Cambridge 
University Press.
Heit, E., & Rotello, C. M. (2010). Relations between inductive reasoning and deductive reasoning. 
Journal of Experimental Psychology: Learning, Memory, and Cognition, 36, 805–812.
Hessels-Schlatter, C. (2010). Development of a theoretical framework and practical application of games 
in fostering cognitive and metacognitive skills. Journal of Cognitive Education and Psychology, 9, 
116–138.
Hofstadter, D. R. (2001). Epilogue: Analogy as the core of cognition. In D. Gentner, K. J. Holyoak, & B. 
N. Kokinov (Eds.), The analogical mind: Perspectives from cognitive science (pp. 499–538). Cambridge, 
MA: Massachusetts Institute of Technology Press.
Holland, J. H., Holyoak, K. J., Nisbett, R. E., & Thagard, P. (1986). Induction: Processes of inference, 
learning, and discovery. Cambridge, MA: Massachusetts Institute of Technology Press.
Holyoak, K. J., & Thagard, P. (1997). The analogical mind. The American Psychologist, 52, 35–44.
Houdé, O. (2000). Inhibition and cognitive development: Object, number, categorization, and reasoning. 
Cognitive Development, 15, 63–73.
Jarosz, A. F., & Wiley, J. (2012). Why does working memory capacity predict RAPM performance? 
A possible role of distraction. Intelligence, 40, 427–438.
Kagan, J., Pearson, L., & Welch, L. (1966). Conceptual impulsivity and inductive reasoning. Child 
Development, 584–594.
Karpov, Y. V. (2013). A way to implement the neo-Vygotskian theoretical learning approach in the 
schools. International Journal of Pedagogical Innovations, 1, 25–35.
Klauer, K. J., & Phye, G. D. (1994). Cognitive training for children: A developmental program of inductive 
reasoning and problem solving. Seattle, WA: Hogrefe.
Klauer, K. J., & Phye, G. D. (2008). Inductive reasoning. A training approach. Review of Educational 
Research, 78, 85–123.
Klauer, K. J., Willmes, K., & Phye, G. D. (2002). Inducing inductive reasoning: Does it transfer to fluid 
intelligence? Contemporary Educational Psychology, 27, 1–25.
Kokis, J. V., Macpherson, R., Toplak, M. E., West, R. F., & Stanovich, K. E. (2002). Heuristic and ana-
lytic processing: Age trends and associations with cognitive ability and cognitive styles. Journal of 
Experimental Child Psychology, 83, 26–52.
Kuhn, D. (2013). Reasoning. In P. D. Zelazo (Ed.), The Oxford handbook of developmental psychology 
(pp. 744–760). Oxford, NY: Oxford University Press.
Kuhn, D., Katz, J. B., & Dean, D. (2004). Developing reason. Thinking and Reasoning, 10, 197–219.
Lawson, C. A., & Fisher, A. V. (2009). When sample size matters: The influence of sample size on cat-
egory variability on children’s and adults inductive reasoning. In N. Taatgen & H. van Rijn (Eds.), 
Proceedings of the 31st Annual Meeting of the Cognitive Science Society (pp. 1324–1329). Amsterdam, 
The Netherlands: Cognitive Science Society.
Lawson, C. A., & Fisher, A. V. (2011). It’s in the sample: The effects of sample size on the development 
of inductive generalization. Journal of Experimental Child Psychology, 110, 499–519.
Leech, R., Mareschal, D., & Cooper, R. P. (2007). Relations as transformations: Implications for analogi-
cal reasoning. Quarterly Journal of Experimental Psychology, 60, 897–908.
Copyright © Springer Publishing Company, LLC
Children’s Inductive Reasoning 407
Mackey, A. P., Hill, S. S., Stone, S. I., & Bunge, S. A. (2011). Differential effects of reasoning and speed 
training in children. Developmental Science, 14, 582–590.
Markman, A. B., & Gentner, D. (2001). Thinking. Annual Review of Psychology, 52, 223–247.
Molnár, G. (2011). Playful fostering of 6- to 8-year-old students’ inductive reasoning. Thinking Skills and 
Creativity, 6, 91–99.
Molnár, G., Greiff, S., & Csapó, B. (2013). Inductive reasoning, domain specific and complex problem 
solving: Relations and development. Thinking Skills and Creativity, 9, 35–45.
Morrison, R. G., Doumas, L. A., & Richland, L. E. (2011). A computational account of children’s ana-
logical reasoning: Balancing inhibitory control in working memory and relational representation. 
Developmental Science, 14, 516–529.
Moshman, D. (1995). Reasoning as self-constrained thinking. Human Development, 38, 53–64.
Moshman, D. (2004). From inference to reasoning: The construction of rationality. Thinking and 
Reasoning, 10, 221–239.
Nisbett, R. E. (2009). Intelligence and how to get it. New York, NY: Norton.
Nisbett, R. E., Fong, G. T., Lehman, D. R., & Cheng, P. W. (1987). Teaching reasoning. Science, 238, 
625–631.
Oakland, T., & Hu, S. (1992). The top ten tests used with children and youth worldwide. Bulletin of the 
International Test Commission, 19, 99–120.
Oberauer, K., Süb, H.-M., Wilhelm, O., & Wittmann, W. W. (2008). Which working memory function 
predicts intelligence? Intelligence, 36, 641–652.
Paour, J.-L. (1992). Induction of logic structures in the mentally retarded: An assessment and interven-
tion instrument. In H. C. Haywood & D. Tzuriel (Eds.), Interactive assessment (pp. 119–166). New 
York, NY: Springer Publishing.
Paour, J.-L. (1995). Entraîner les fondements du raisonnement inductif et analogique [Cognitive training 
of inductive and analogical reasoning]. In F. Büchel (Ed.), L’éducation cognitive [Cognitive education] 
(pp. 267–283). Lausanne, Switzerland: Delachaux et Niestlé.
Perkins, D. (1995). Outsmarting IQ: The emerging science of learnable intelligence. New York, NY: Free 
Press.
Perkins, D., Tishman, S., Ritchart, R., Donis, K., & Andrade, A. (2000). Intelligence in the wild: A dispo-
sitional view of intellectual traits. Educational Psychology Review, 12, 269–293.
Perret, P., Dauvier, B., Bailleux, C., & Thomachot, L. (2013). Intégration relationnelle en mémoire de 
travail et intelligence fluide chez l’enfant [Relational integration in working memory and children’s 
fluid intelligence]. L’Année Psychologique/Topics in Cognitive Psychology, 113, 191–212.
Phye, G. D. (1990). Inductive problem solving: Schema inducement and memory-based transfer. Jour-
nal of Educational Psychology, 82, 826–831.
Pillow, B. H., & Pearson, R. M. (2012). Children’s evaluation of the certainty of another person’s in-
ductive inferences and guesses. Cognitive Development, 27, 299–313.
Rattermann, M. J., & Gentner, D. (1998). More evidence for a relational shift in the development of anal-
ogy: Children’s performance on a causal-mapping task. Cognitive Development, 13, 453–478.
Raven, J., Raven, J. C., & Court, J. H. (1998). Manual for Raven’s Progressive Matrices and Vocabulary 
Scales. Section 1: General overview. San Antonio, TX: Harcourt Assessment.
Rothbart, M. K., & Rueda, M. R. (2005). The development of effortful control. In U. Mayr, E. Awh, & S. W. 
Keele (Eds.), Developing individuality in the human brain: A tribute to Michael I. Posner (pp. 167–188). 
Washington, DC: American Psychological Association.
Rueda, M. R., Rothbart, M. K., Saccamanno, L., & Posner, M. I. (2005). Training, maturation and genetic 
influences on the development of executive attention. Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences, 
USA, 102, 14931–14936.
Schulz, L. E., Goodman, N. D., Tenenbaum, J. B., & Jenkins, C. A. (2008). Going beyond the evidence: 
Abstract laws and preschoolers’ responses to anomalous data. Cognition, 109, 211–223.
Copyright © Springer Publishing Company, LLC
408 Perret
Shipstead, Z., Hicks, K. L., & Engle, R. W. (2012). Cogmed working memory training: Does the evidence 
support the claims? Journal of Applied Research in Memory and Cognition, 1, 185–193.
Siegler, R. S. (1996). Emerging minds: The process of change in children’s thinking. New York, NY: Oxford 
University Press.
Siegler, R. S. (2000). The rebirth of children’s learning. Child Development, 71, 26–35.
Siegler, R. S., & Stern, E. (1998). A microgenetic analysis of conscious and unconscious strategy 
discoveries. Journal of Experimental Psychology: General, 127, 377–397.
Snow, R. E. (1980). Aptitude processes. In R. E. Snow, P.-A. Federico, & W. E. Montague (Eds.), Aptitude, 
learning, and instruction: Cognitive process analyses of aptitude (pp. 27–63). Hillsdale, NJ: Lawrence 
Erlbaum Associates.
Spearman, C. (1927). The nature of “intelligence” and the principles of cognition. London, United Kingdom: 
MacMillan.
Sternberg, R. J. (1983). Natural, unnatural, and supernatural concepts. Cognitive Psychology, 14, 451–488.
Sternberg, R. J. (1986). Toward a unified theory of human reasoning. Intelligence, 10, 281–314.
Sternberg, R. J., & Gardner, M. K. (1983). Unities in inductive reasoning. Journal of Experimental 
Psychology: General, 112, 80–116.
Stroop, J. R. (1935). Studies of interference in serial verbal reactions. Journal of Experimental Psychology, 
18, 643–661.
Thibaut, J.-P., French, R., & Vezneva, M. (2010). The development of analogy making in children: 
Cognitive load and executive functions. Journal of Experimental Child Psychology, 106, 1–19.
Thomas, M. S. C., & Mareschal, D. (2001). Metaphor as categorisation: A connectionist implementation. 
Metaphor and Symbol, 16, 5–27.
Thorell, L. B., Lindqvist, S., Bergman Nutley, S., Bohlin, G., & Klingberg, T. (2009). Training and transfer 
effects of executive functions in preschool children. Developmental Science, 12, 106–113.
Tomic, W., & Kingma, J. (1998). Accelerating intelligence development through inductive reasoning 
training. Advances in Cognition and Educational Practice, 5, 291–305.
Verguts, T., & De Boeck, P. (2002). The induction of solution rules in Raven’s Progressive Matrices Test. 
European Journal of Cognitive Psychology, 14, 521–547.
Vigneau, F., Caissie, A., & Bors, D. A. (2006). Eye-movement analysis demonstrates strategic influences 
on individual differences in intelligence. Intelligence, 34, 261–272.
Viskontas, I. V., Morrison, R. G., Holyoak, K. J., Hummel, J. E., & Knowlton, B. J. (2004). Relational 
integration, inhibition, and analogical reasoning in older adults. Psychology and Aging, 19, 581–591.
Vodegel-Matzen, L., van der Molen, M., & Dudink, A. (1994). Error analysis of Raven test performance. 
Personality and Individual Differences, 16, 433–445.
Whitebread, D. (1996). The development of children’s strategies on an inductive reasoning task. British 
Journal of Educational Psychology, 66, 1–21.
Wiley, J., Jarosz, A. F., Cushen, P. J., & Colflesh, G. J. H. (2011). New rule use drives the relation be-
tween working memory capacity and Raven’s Advanced Progressive Matrices. Journal of Experimen-
tal Psychology: Learning, Memory, and Cognition, 37, 256–263.
Yeager, D. S., & Dweck, C. S. (2012). Mindsets that promote resilience: When students believe that per-
sonal characteristics can be developed. Educational Psychologist, 47, 302–314.
Zelazo, P. D. (Ed.). (2013). Developmental psychology: A new synthesis. In The Oxford handbook of devel-
opmental psychology (pp. 3–34). Oxford, NY: Oxford University Press.
Correspondence regarding this article should be directed to Patrick Perret, Aix Marseille Université, 
Maison de la Recherche, Faculté des Arts, Lettres, Langues et Sciences Humaines, 29, av. Robert 
Schuman 13 621- Aix-en-Provence Cedex 1, France. E-mail: Patrick.Perret@univ-amu.fr
Copyright © Springer Publishing Company, LLC
